Islamification of World Finances

An Egyptian cleric, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, has called for Muslims to replace capitalism with an Islamic economic system. More reason to discover more oil in the US, build more Nuclear power plants, expand use of clean coal and natural gas, expand current alternative fuel and fuel reduction technologies, bring down the cost of alternative fueld and fuel reduction technologies and develop new alternative fuel sources.

I guess al-Qaradawi also does not realize that all the money they have becomes worthless if the worlds economy collapses and the need for oil disappears…

I guess he also does not understand that the arab wealth based on oil money is based on the principals of Capitalism. This is just another Muslim Extremist looking for world domination

Muslims should take advantage of the global financial crisis to build an economic system compatible with Islamic principles, influential Sunni cleric Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi said on Sunday.”The collapse of the capitalist system based on usury and paper and not on goods traded on the market is proof that it is in crisis and shows that Islamic economic philosophy is holding up,” said the Egyptian-born, Qatar-based cleric.

“The Western system has collapsed and we have a complete economic philosophy as well as spiritual strength,” he said at Sunday’s opening of a conference on Jerusalem.

All riches are ours… the Islamic nation has all or nearly all the oil and we have an economic philosophy that no one else has,” Qaradawi said.

He urged Muslims to “profit from the crisis to bring about the triumph of the (Islamic) nation, which holds the spiritual and material resources for victory.”

The sixth conference on Jerusalem is being attended by around 300 people representing political parties as well as Muslim and Christian NGOs, from various countries.

It is staged by Al-Quds (Jerusalem) International Institution, which is dedicated to the conservation of the holy city and its sacred places.

Participants include Khaled Meshaal, exiled head of the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas, and Ali Akbar Velayati, a top adviser to Iranian spiritual leader Ali Khamenei.

The three-day conference will look at ways of protecting Jerusalem and its holy sites, which participants believe are threatened by Israel. 

Dix Six Recruiting Terrorist In Jail

Well, the Dix Six, who recently tried to petition a judge that they should be moved into general polulation because they were not receiving fair access to the evidence in their case, seem to have other motives for wanting to be in the general population. As I pointed out in a previous post, location has nothing to do with access to evidence, that is their lawyers job to arrange for that. Also I said that they were in a secured area for their own safety. Well on top of that they are in a secure area for the safety of the general public. These scumbags are trying to recruit more terrorists while in jail, from the jails polulation. Not that this does not happen normally with Muslims in jail, but this is a group of terrorists who were in the processes of planning an attack.

Personally I think each one should be shipped to a maximum security detention center and each one should be completely isolated. These guys are a threat to our national security.

HADDONFIELD, New Jersey —  Federal authorities say one of the men accused of planning an attack on soldiers at the Fort Dix army base gave another inmate in a federal detention center an Al Qaeda recruitment video and another wrote a note referring to the fight “we weren’t able to finish.”

The U.S. Attorney’s Office made the allegations in a brief filed in U.S. District Court late Tuesday to oppose the suspects’ request to be granted bail.

A lawyer for one of the men said the government is misrepresenting an incident in the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia.

The suspects contend that the detention center staff has not allowed them adequate access to evidence in the case against them as they prepare for trial. That is why they have asked a judge to either allow them to be free on bail or come up with alternate arrangements to allow them to review materials for the trial, which is scheduled to begin March 24.

The five men — all foreign-born Muslims in their 20s — were arrested in May and charged with conspiring to kill uniformed military personnel. Authorities said they planned to sneak onto Fort Dix, a base in New Jersey used primarily to train reservists for duty in Iraq and Afghanistan.

There was no attack, however.

A sixth man later pleaded guilty to providing weapons to some of the five charged in the alleged conspiracy.

In the legal filing, the government said Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer gave another inmate a copy of an Al Qaeda-produced DVD last month. Guards found the disc in a book in the detention center’s law library.

Government lawyers said in the filing that “the fact the defendant Shnewer and, perhaps, his co-conspirators may be spreading jihadist recruitment videos to other inmates clearly raises grave security concerns for the warden, and, again, supports the reasonableness of continued administrative detention for these defendants.”

Shnewer’s lawyer, Rocco Cipparone, said Shnewer told him 10 days or so ago about the incident. But Cipparone said Shnewer did not give the other inmate the video. Rather, he said, Shnewer was upset that the man somehow got hold of evidence that only the defendants in the case were supposed to see.

The government also said that suspect Eljvir Duka and another inmate were passing notes.

In one note, the government said, Duka wrote, “Now you see why we were going to sacrifice all for the sake of Allah in jihad” and referred to the fight “we weren’t able to finish.”

The government said detention center staff confronted Duka about the notes. According to the filing, he acknowledged he was passing them but said they only dealt with “issues such as the quality of the food” behind bars.

Duka’s lawyer, Troy Archie, did not immediately return a voice mail or e-mail message Tuesday night.

The government also said the five men have had access to the evidence when they requested it.

The five suspects include three ethnic Albanians from the former Yugoslavia, a Jordanian and a Turk.

A hearing on the men’s bail motion is scheduled for Dec. 20.

Paris Riots Spreading But Less Intense

Last night, riots broke out south of Paris  in Toulouse as well as Villiers-le-Bel. Police report the overall situation was not as intense as the first two nights of rioting. France’s President Sarkozy is taking the hard line on the issue and reitterating that those that shot at police will be prosecuted.

Sarkozy is meeting the with family of the two boys who died prior to meeting with his security heads to determine which course of action to take.

Rioters are still burning cars and libraries showing it is nothing more than movement of destruction and nothing more.

PARIS, France (AP) — French President Nicolas Sarkozy said Wednesday that rioters who shot at police would be brought to justice and called the violence that rocked Paris suburbs “absolutely unacceptable.”

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Armed masked police patrol the streets of Villiers-le-Bel Tuesday night.

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It was the first time Sarkozy, who had just returned from China, entered the fray since the rioting broke out Sunday night.

The violence ebbed Tuesday night after police were deployed in force and quickly rounded up youths lobbing Molotov cocktails and setting cars ablaze.

The violence has drawn comparisons with riots that raged through suburbs nationwide in 2005, and has shown that anger still smolders in poor housing projects where many Arabs, blacks and other minorities live largely isolated from the rest of society.

“We will find the shooters,” and they will “be brought to account before justice,” Sarkozy said after meeting with a wounded police captain hospitalized in Eaubonne north of Paris.

The violence erupted Sunday after the deaths of two minority teens whose motorscooter collided with a police car in Villiers-le-Bel, a blue-collar town on Paris’ northern edge.

Residents claimed the officers left without helping the teens. Prosecutor Marie-Therese de Givry denied that, saying police stayed on the scene until firefighters arrived.

Sarkozy described the teens’ deaths as “distressing.” But he added: “Shooting at police has no link to this incident.”

The French president was meeting Wednesday morning with the families of the two teens who died, and with the mayor of Villiers-le-Bel before having a security meeting with his top ministers.

While cars were set ablaze for a third night Tuesday, officials said the violence was less intense than the two previous nights. Interior Minister Michele Alliot-Marie said the overall situation was “calm.” Still, she said on Europe-1 radio, police presence would remain reinforced “as long as necessary.”

She said 39 people were arrested in the Paris region Tuesday night.

Bands of young people set more cars on fire Tuesday in and around Villiers-le-Bel. In the southern city of Toulouse, 20 cars were set ablaze, and fires at two libraries were quickly brought under control, police said.

The previous night, 82 officers were injured, 10 of them by buckshot and pellets, the police force said. The use of firearms — rare in 2005 — added a dangerous dimension.

Sarkozy was interior minister, in charge of police, during the 2005 riots and took a hard line against the violence. Even before those riots, he angered many in housing projects when he called delinquents there “scum.”

The violence two years ago also started in the suburbs of northern Paris, when two teens were electrocuted in a power substation while hiding from police.

There have long been tensions between France‘s largely white police force and ethnic minorities in poor neighborhoods. Despite decades of problems and heavy state investments to improve housing and create jobs, the depressed projects that ring Paris are a world apart from the tourist attractions of the French capital. Police speak of no-go zones where they and firefighters fear to patrol.

Put Away Your Tin Foil Hats And Welcome To Reality

The conspiracy theorists are still at it over 9/11… This post from Pajama’s media is what I have been arguing all along with my liberal friends. They just keep coming back to the same unsubstantiated arguement, Well of course Bush Knew and The Special Lunch Meeting of CEOs, lets not forget the Bush wasn’t immediately evacuated from the school he was in, or how about the Jews who were called and told not to go to work at the World Trade Centers on 9/10…

Sixty-two percent of Americans believe it is “very likely” or “somewhat likely” that federal officials knew about the 9-11 attacks in advance and ignored this lifesaving information, according to this recent New York Post report.

The Post, in its typically calm manner, opines “Idiots in the majority.”

This characterization was too much for the blog ThinkProgress.com.

While eschewing conspiracy theories, the ThinkProgress blogger cited three pieces of “evidence” that “prove” that President Bush knew about the 9-11 attacks in advance: the August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Brief; a July 10, 2001 briefing by CIA director George Tenet; and the FBI’s legendary Phoenix memo.

The “smoking gun” is supposed to be the August 6, 2001, President’s Daily Brief, a summary of vital intelligence prepared by the CIA. Its re: line seems to say it all: “Bin Ladin [sic] Determined to Strike in US.”

It seems like a rock solid case, but on closer inspection it is as flimsy as TV backdrop.

Exhibit A is the full text of the PDB, as it is known internally. Recently declassified, the document is clearly not a warning at all, but a rehash of old news reports and outdated intelligence cables.

Here is the briefing paper, in its entirety, except for two minor security redactions:

Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in USClandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and “bring the fighting to America.”
After US missile strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin told followers he wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to a …[redacted] … service.
An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an … [redacted] … service at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit the operative’s access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.

The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Ladin’s first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself, but that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was planning his own US attack.

Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation.

Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.
Al-Qa’ida members — including some who are US citizens — have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks. Two al-Qa’ida members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s.

A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.

We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a … [redacted] … service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of “Blind Shaykh” ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman and other US-held extremists.
Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.

The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the US that it considers Bin Ladin-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our Embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives.

The bulk of the memo is a souped-up history lesson. The mention of “hijackings” comes from foreign intelligence service reports from 1998. Significantly, it does not mention flying hijacked planes into buildings—and it is uncorroborated. In other words, what spooks call “chatter.”

Next it mentions “FBI information” about “suspicious activity”—but does not mention the FBI reports from field offices in Minnesota and Arizona. Finally, the “surveillance” of “federal buildings in New York” is nearly worthless. It is not connected to intelligence about hijackings and, of course, the World Trade Center is not a Federal Building. Finally, the CIA notes that FBI is investigating a possible plot involving “explosives.”

Where is the warning here? A warning is a prediction about a future calamity. Yet, not a single sentence speaks of the future. Instead, every sentence is about the past or the present. A warning implies a degree of alarm. Yet every sentence is as passive as an encyclopedia entry. If the CIA had done its job properly and marshaled the pre-9-11 information that was later uncovered by the 9-11 commission, then, possibly, this document could have turned into a warning. But as it stands, it is not warning. It is a status report. And not a very good one.

Next, let us consider how this “warning” came to be written.

In July, the CIA learned that Italian police had intercepted a cell phone call in Milan. Al Qaeda had long been active in Italy. Italian police and intelligence had foiled plots to attack the U.S. Embassy in Rome and uncovered terror cells in Turin, Milan, and elsewhere. Some were arrested, but many more were the targets of roving wire taps. What the Italians overheard surprised them. Al Qaeda seemed to be planning to assassinate President George W. Bush during a state visit to Genoa, Italy in July 2001.

Security was stepped up. The Italian military supplied a battery of surface-to-air missiles to repel an air attack. The press treated it as simply overkill by the America’s Secret Service and did not probe any deeper.

President Bush was told about the al Qaeda assassination plot in his morning intelligence briefing. He wasn’t happy.

The president said that earlier attempts by President Clinton to capture or kill bin Laden were simply “swatting at flies.” He wanted to “bring this guy down.” He wanted a realistic action plan for killing or capturing Osama bin Laden. When he was informed that the National Security Council was already leading an inter-agency effort to hit bin Laden in Afghanistan, Bush reportedly told Rice that he wanted something more imaginative than a cruise missile strike, which would cost millions “to hit a camel in the butt.”

Bush also demanded a thorough review of all intelligence about terrorist threats from al Qaeda, including the possibility of attacks inside the United States. That is why the PDB, which was delivered on August 6, 2001, was prepared.

At Bush’s small ranch house amid the scrub pine near Crawford, Texas, the CIA presented its findings. Condoleeza Rice tuned in via a secure teleconferencing link from her White House office.

Neither Bush nor Rice was happy with the briefing. Rice later described the briefing as “vague,” a rehash of existing intelligence with no new analysis; it merely recited that bin Laden was dangerous, had plans to attack America, and that we should be careful. Not exactly a call to arms.

Little wonder that then-National Security Advisor Rice told the 9-11 Commission that “the country had taken the steps that it could given there was no threat reporting what might happen inside the United States.”

Certainly, the intelligence community was abuzz with “threat reports” with no specifics about where, when, and how al Qaeda would strike. Months before the September 11 attacks, the CIA Counter-Terrorism Center—known as the “CTC”—distributed a classified memo headlined “Threat of Impending al Qaeda Attack to Continue Indefinitely.” CIA Director George Tenet dismissed it as “maddeningly short on actionable details.” And that report was not distributed outside of the CIA.

Richard Clarke, the hard-driving “counter-terrorism czar,” testified before the 9-11 commission about pre-September 11 intelligence. He said that the number of “al Qaeda threats and other terrorist threats was in the tens of thousands—probably hundreds of thousands.” But none of it contained specific information that could be used to stop the 9-11 plot. Clarke is even more emphatic in his book, Against All Enemies: “Had we had any chance of stopping it, had we the knowledge we needed to prevent that day, those of us sitting as members of CSG [Counterterrorism Security Group] would literally have given our lives to do so; many of those around the CSG table had already put their lives at risk for their country.”

What was lacking was “actionable intelligence.” To prevent the 9-11 attacks (or any terrorist attack), intelligence officials need to know the target, timing, and type of attack, what counterterrorism researcher Kevin Michael Derksen calls “the three T’s of tactical intelligence.” Without knowing all three elements—when, where, and how—an attack cannot be stopped. If you knew that al Qaeda was going to attack the World Trade Center on September 11, but assumed a truck bomb attack, you would be inspecting cars while the planes crashed overhead.
A State Department intelligence officer once described the analytic side of the spy business this way:

“Imagine your boss… placing a lunch-size brown bag twisted at the top on your desk and asking you to tell him what the contents mean? Dutifully, you untwist the bag and spill the contents on your desk. The contents are some sixty pieces of a puzzle. As you look over the puzzle pieces you immediately notice that about one-third of [them] are blank, and another third appear to have edges that have been cut off. As you look at the pieces that have some part of a picture on them, you sense that this is really a mixture of about four different puzzles. Now keep in mind that you have no boxtop to tell you what the puzzle should look like and you do not know how many pieces are in the puzzle…welcome to the art of terrorism analysis. We rarely see a majority of the pieces of a terrorist threat puzzle. When we do, action is taken.

Did the president—or any member of the intelligence community—have enough puzzle pieces to prevent the September 11 attacks?

Both the 9-11 commission and the U.S. Congress’ “Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,” exhaustively investigated this question. Both used professional investigators to comb through the public record, took sworn testimony from officials, and enjoyed access to reams of classified material.

Both identified dozens of intelligence failures, mostly relating to information sharing, bureaucratic infighting, computer problems, and boneheaded decisions. Still, both bodies came to the same conclusion: that the intelligence community did not know the timing, the target, or the type of attack. So the president had no actionable intelligence.

For those who are tempted to dismiss the reports of both the 9-11 commission and Congress’ Joint Inquiry as a “whitewash,” remember that the hijackers themselves did not know the three Ts. A December 2001 raid on an al Qaeda safe house in Afghanistan turned up a video tape, which featured a lengthy speech by Osama bin Laden.

“The brothers, who conducted the operation, all they knew was that they have a martyrdom operation and that we asked each of them to go to America, but they didn’t know anything about the operation, not even one letter. But they were trained and we did not reveal the operation to them until they are there [in the United States] and just before they boarded the planes.

Those who were trained to fly didn’t know the others. One group of people did not know the other group.”

The majority of the hijackers, until the morning of September 11, did not know the target or the type of attack. And the timing was not disclosed to them until a few days before the attack, according to the 9-11 Commission report. (Indeed, it was originally slated for May, then for July, before bin Laden chose September 11—the seven-year anniversary of the 1996 conviction of Ramzi Youssef, who planned the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.) If the hijackers were apprehended before September 11, there is very little they could say—even if they wanted to cooperate.

So how would it be possible for the president to know something that the terror cell members did not?

Those on the right and left—everyone from the Washington Times’ Bill Gertz to filmmaker Michael Moore—who cling to idea that U.S. government had enough foreknowledge of the attacks to stop them usually cite a handful of reports. Let’s examine each of them.

Gertz, in his book Breakdown: How America’s Intelligence Failures Led to September 11, notes an interview with Kie Fallis, a onetime Defense Intelligence Agency analyst. Fallis told him: “I obtained information in January of 2000 that indicated terrorists were planning two or three major attacks against the United States. The only gaps were where and when.” That is akin to saying that you will win the lottery, the only gaps are the winning numbers and the day on which to play them.

It turns out that Fallis did not even know that al Qaeda planned to hijack planes and ram them into buildings. All Fallis knew is that four al Qaeda operatives, some of whom were tied to the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, had met in Malaysia in January 2000—and that they were up to no good. What exactly is the president supposed to do with this information?

Others point to two September 10 phone intercepts of the National Security Agency. The NSA overheard two Arabic speakers say “The match begins tomorrow” and “tomorrow is zero hour.” These seem to be coded conversations about an upcoming attack.

The intelligence community was not told about these intercepts until after the September 11 attacks.

This looks like a dramatic example of foreknowledge, but it isn’t.

NSA Director Michael Hayden was called on to the carpet in June 2002 by the Congress’ Joint Inquiry. He pointed out that the agency gathers some two million intercepts per hour. Analysts must make snap decisions about which ones to translate and pass on. The two intercepts were put aside as “unactionable” because they did not contain information about a target or a type of attack. All the NSA knew is that tomorrow, somewhere in the world, al Qaeda was hoping to strike somehow. Again, nothing to go on. Messages like this are intercepted routinely and analysts know that many such intercepts are disinformation, when there is no attack in the works.

Still others point to the arrest of Zacarias Moussaui, the so-called “20th hijacker.” Even now, terrorism analysts cannot agree if Moussaoui was supposed to be part of what al Qaeda high command called “the planes operation” or part of a planned second wave of attacks.

Here are the facts that are not in contention: A Pan Am International Flight Academy instructor became suspicious of Moussaoui because he wanted to learn how to fly a 747, but not how to take-off or land. The concerned instructor had to phone the Minnesota FBI four times and, even then, only got the attention of a Special Agent by blurting out “a 747 loaded with fuel can be used as a bomb.”
Moussaoui, who the FBI linked to an al Qaeda affiliate in Chechnya on August 26, 2001, refused to cooperate. When he did talk, months after the attacks, it became clear that he had no knowledge of the target or timing of the attack. It is unclear whether Moussaoui thought he would be part of a conventional hijacking.

Again, no actionable intelligence.

What about the famous “Phoenix memo”?

Kenneth Williams, a veteran policeman turned FBI Special Agent, interviewed some Arab men who were taking flight lessons in Arizona, men who had aroused his suspicions. One had a picture of bin Laden in his living room. Others were tied to an al Qaeda group in London. On July 10, 2001, he e-mailed the FBI’s Osama bin Laden unit and the FBI’s New York Field Office, which often takes the lead in counter-terrorism investigations. The so-called Phoenix memo was quietly shelved—until after 9-11.

Did it contain information that could have tipped off the federal government to the killers living among us?

The 9-11 commission did not think so.

“If the memo had been distributed in a timely fashion and its recommendations were acted on promptly, we do not believe it would have uncovered the plot.”
Kevin Michael Derksen of the University of Winnipeg investigated pre-911 intelligence for the specialist journal Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. He concludes that “security agencies should not be held responsible for failing to forestall what was an impenetrable terrorist plot. An examination of the evidence has shown that security agencies did not have the actionable intelligence they needed to prevent the attack or the means to obtain it.”

Even so, the intelligence services performed poorly. Here is a partial list of some of the intelligence failures uncovered by investigators.

* The very high barrier placed by the Foreign Intelligence Security Act prevented FBI and CIA counter-intelligence operatives from working together or sharing information.
* The FBI’s computer system was horribly antiquated. When the Phoenix office of the FBI issued a warning about the possibility of fundamentalists entering the United States to train on airplane simulators, Phoenix agents had no way of searching the FBI’s internal database to see if there were any other reports about fundamentalists taking flight training in the U.S. Some FBI offices could not even send e-mails to other offices.
* For more than two years, the National Security Agency had tapped the phones of an al Qaeda safe house in Sana’a, the capital of Yemen. The NSA analysts had the ability to trace some (but not all) of the calls made from the safe house. In particular, they were suspicious about an al Qaeda operative named “Khalid.” But they couldn’t determine Khalid’s last name or where he was headed. As U.S. News & World Report reported in 2004, only after 9-11 did the NSA discover that the Khalid in question was Khalid al-Mihdar, who hijacked the plane that crashed into the Pentagon. The safe house belonged to al-Mihdar’s father-in-law.
* British restaurant worker Niaz Khan told the FBI in 2000 that al Qaeda was planning to attack the U.S. The FBI let him go, took no action (except to put Khan on the list of people banned from flying into the U.S). After Khan returned to Britain, he tried to contact British intelligence, but they didn’t want to hear from him. Only after he contacted Crimestoppers, a British television series, did anyone pay any attention to him.
* The FBI had several tips about a mosque in San Diego where some of the 9-11 hijackers had worshipped. Yet the bureau had no idea that the plot was underway, even though they had extensive wiretaps on some of the activities there.

Even if intelligence officers could have followed up on these leads, it is doubtful they would have uncovered “actionable intelligence” about the target, timing, and type of attack. Remember, the hijackers themselves did not know all of these details until the morning of September 11.

The only way that the president could have been warned prior to 9-11 would be if American intelligence had an “asset” among bin Laden’s inner circle in Afghanistan—and it did not.

Stubbornly, some believe that the CIA must have warned the president; essentially they assume that the CIA is omniscient. But as historian David McCullough, speaking in another context, told the Christian Science Monitor, “You can’t ever judge why people did things the way they did in the past unless you take into consideration what they didn’t know. Looking back, we say: They should have known, or listened to him or to her. It’s never that simple.’”

Why does this conspiracy theory linger? Historian Joseph E. Persico argues that it is simply human nature. Persico is an acknowledged expert on the last surprise attack on the American homeland, the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor. He notes that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had some inkling of Japan’s dark designs before the December 7, 1941 attack. Relations between Washington and Tokyo had been souring for years and the U.S. was opposed to Japan’s bloody invasion and occupation of eastern China. So FDR knew that Japan might attack at some point. But there was no intelligence suggesting that Japan would attack at Pearl Harbor or when it would attack or how. Still FDR’s critics and many others continue to suspect that he knew all along and that he allowed Pearl Harbor to happen as a “backdoor to war.”

“Why do conspiracy theories keep sprouting?” Persico asks. “Neat, suspenseful plots create high drama, while the truth is often messy, contradictory, even dull.”

Unfortunately, the same is true today. Bush’s critics are as misguided as FDR’s.

Muslim Riots In France Part Deux

Again riots have broken out in the suburbs of Paris, however this time the riots are armed with guns. After two nights, this latest round looks to be more intense than the 2005 riots. This time police are accused of a hit and run…

What I find interesting no media outlet is saying this is a Muslim Riot. Just like in 2005, the liberal media was afraid to say it was a Muslim Riot while it was happening. This time they keep repeating “youths” from an Arab, Black and White housing block… The media needs to call this for what it is. Stop the political correctness…

This is terrorism, not just riots.

“We all know what happened. It was deliberate,” added a young man in his early twenties. “The police treat us like animals each day. Now, they have declared war. Well, they can have a war.”

The two youths involved in the accident in question have typical Muslim names:

Youths in Villiers-le-Bel alleged that the dead boys – named only as Moushin, 15, and 16-year-old Larami –

A brother of the one “victims”, has said this is not violence, but an expression of rage, notice how they are already being dubbed victims, when all official reports that they caused the accident. Well I would call this both, yes it an expression of rage, however it is a violent expression of rage…

Omar Sehhouli, brother of one of the victims, told France Info radio: “This is a failure to assist a person in danger. It is 100 % a [police] blunder. They know it, and that’s why they did not stay at the scene,” he told France Info radio.

Sehhouli also told the news agency AFP that the rioting “was not violence but an expression of rage”.

However maybe they are Christian Arabs and I am jumping to conclusions based on the last series of riots and now established violent history of the Muslims in France.

VILLIERS-LE-BEL, France — Rampaging youths rioted overnight in the suburbs of Paris, hurling Molotov cocktails and setting fire to dozens of cars. At least 77 officers were injured, a senior police union official said Tuesday.

The violence was more intense than during three weeks of rioting in 2005, said the official, Patrice Ribeiro. Police were shot at and are facing “genuine urban guerillas with conventional weapons and hunting weapons.”

Some officers were hit by shotgun pellets, Interior Minister Michele Alliot-Marie said. She said there were six serious injuries, “people who notably were struck in the face and close to the eyes.”

The trigger for the rioting was the deaths of two teens killed in a crash with a police patrol car on Sunday in Villiers-le-Bel, a town of public housing blocks home to a mix of Arab, black and white residents in Paris’s northern suburbs.

Residents said that officers left the crash scene without helping the teens, whose motorbike collided with the car. Officials cast doubt on the claim, but the internal police oversight agency was investigating.

Youths first rioted that night and again overnight Monday to Tuesday, when the violence apparently got worse. Rioters set police barricades on fire and threw stones and Molotov cocktails at officers, who retaliated with tear gas and rubber bullets. In Villiers-le-Bel and surrounding areas, youths set fire to 36 vehicles, the area’s prefecture said. Youths were seen firing buckshot at police and reporters.

A police union official said a round from a hunting rifle pierced the body armor of one officer who suffered a serious shoulder wound. Among the buildings targeted by the youths was a library, which was set afire.

In Sunday’s violence, eight people were arrested and 20 police officers were injured — including the town’s police chief, who was beaten in the face when he tried to negotiate with the rioters, police said. One firefighter also was injured.

The unrest in 2005 was prompted by the deaths of two teens electrocuted in a power substation while hiding from police in a suburb northeast of Paris.

Terrorists Use Infant In Suicide Bombing

Another horrific act by Islamic Terrorists, during the recent attempt to assassinate former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, was conducted using a baby to try and get the bomb close enought to kill Ms. Bhutto. It is POS’ like this that makes all of Islam to look bad and why  people are becoming less tolerant.

What is the sense of sacrificing a baby, just because you are not man enough to be a Jihadist by yourself.

Meanwhile, horrifying new details emerged last night of the attempt by suicide bombers to kill Ms Bhutto on her return home from exile last month.

Investigators from Ms Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party said yesterday they believed the bomb, which killed 170 people and left hundreds more wounded, was strapped to a one-year-old child carried by its jihadist father.

They said the suicide bomber tried repeatedly to carry the baby to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle as she drove in a late-night cavalcade through the streets of Karachi.

“At the point where the bombs exploded, Benazir Bhutto herself saw the man with the child and asked him to come closer so that she could hug or kiss the infant,” investigators were reported as saying. “But someone came in between and a guard felt that the man with the child was not behaving normally. So the child was not allowed to come aboard Benazir’s vehicle.”

Ms Bhutto is said to have told investigators she recalls the face of the man who was carrying the infant. She has asked to see recordings made by television news channels to try to identify the man.

300,000 Iraqis Condem Iran

Over 300,000 Iraqi’s have signed a petition condeming Iran for its involvement in terrorist activity in Iraq. The strength of this petition is that it 600 Shi’ite leaders have signed this petition.

The petition itself will probably have no affect on the Iranian Terrorists, however it shows the rest of the world that Iraqi’s are fed up with the destruction and killing being fostered by Iran, and it shows the world that the Iraqi’s feel that Iran is involved in the terror in Iraq.

More evidence the “surge” is working, something the liberal media is in denial over…

BAGHDAD (Reuters) – More than 300,000 Iraqis including 600 Shi’ite tribal leaders have signed a petition accusing Iran of sowing “disorder” in southern Iraq, a group of sheikhs involved in the campaign said.

The sheikhs showed Reuters two thick bundles of notes which contained original signatures. The sheikhs said more than 300,000 people had signed the pages.

Such a public and organized display of animosity toward neighboring Shi’ite Iran is rare in Iraq. Iranian influence has grown steadily, especially in the predominantly Shi’ite south, since the U.S.-led invasion toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003.

“More than 300,000 people from the southern provinces condemned the interference of the Iranian regime in Iraq and especially in spreading security disorder in the provinces,” the sheikhs said in a statement.

They did not elaborate, but Washington and the U.S. military accuse Iran of arming, training and funding Shi’ite militias in Iraq. Iran denies the charge and blames the violence in Iraq on the U.S. invasion.

The sheikhs declined to be identified for fear of retribution. They said various groups had been collecting the signatures for six months across southern Iraq. It was not immediately clear what they planned to do with the petition.

With Shi’ite Muslims in power in Baghdad after the ouster of Saddam, a Sunni Arab who was an enemy of Tehran, ties have strengthened between the two oil-producing states.

But some Iraqis chafe at the influence of Iran’s more conservative brand of religion in the south.

Shi’ites comprise around 60 percent of Iraq’s population, generally put at 26-27 million before the 2003 invasion.

“The most poisonous dagger stabbed in us, the Iraqi Shi’ites, is the (Iranian) regime shamefully exploiting the Shi’ite sect to implement its evil goals,” the statement said.

“They have targeted our national interests and began planning to divide Iraq and to separate the southern provinces from Iraq.”

Iran routinely pledges its support for a stable Iraq, and political leaders from Baghdad regularly visit Tehran.

STRICT ISLAMIC RULES

The statement said that besides 600 Shi’ite tribal leaders, the petition was signed by a number of lawyers, engineers, doctors and university professors.

The group of sheikhs is the same one that told Reuters last month that Shi’ite Islamist political parties were imposing strict Islamic rules in southern Iraq and using their armed wings to create a state of fear.

Such fears are not unfounded — two provincial governors were blown up by roadside bombs in August, apparent victims of infighting between the Shi’ite parties for political dominance in the region, source of most of Iraq’s oil wealth.

Aides to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the reclusive religious leader of Iraq’s Shi’ites, have also been killed.

The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the movement of cleric Moqtada al-Sadr are the dominant political forces in the Shi’ite provinces. Both have links to neighbouring Iran and believe Iraq should be governed according to Islamic principles.

SIIC and the Sadrists saw their rise to power cemented by the December 2005 elections which brought the Islamist Shi’ite Alliance to power. The Sadrists have since pulled out of the Alliance and the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, leader of the smaller Islamist Dawa party.

The growing strength of the Shi’ite parties in the south has weakened some secular tribal leaders and excluded them from power structures, a source of patronage and revenues.

(Writing by Dean Yates; Editing by Dominic Evans)